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Natural Rights and History: 
Hugo Grotius's Modern 
Translation of Aristotle 
Jeremy Seth Geddert 
Cicero writes in de Finibus that "nature never forgets its own primary prop­
erties." This leads him to inquire, "then how comes it that human nature 
alone abandons man?"1 If Hugo Grotius were alive today, he might wonder 
the same thing. Grotius's language of nature remains surprisingly enduring in 
contemporary discourse. Yet most students of political thought seem to have 
forgotten the man. This inattention is a notable change from the seventeenth 
through nineteenth centuries, during which one contemporary described Gro­
tius as "the greatest universal scholar since Aristotle."2 Grotius's fame began 
in 1598, when King Henry IV of France pronounced the fifteen-year-old 
prodigy as "the miracle of Holland." By his early twenties he became the 
Pensionary of Rotterdam, and by his early thirties he penned major works of 
history, literature, political philosophy, and theology. After imprisonment for 
his ideas, and daring escape from prison in a chest of books, he spent the rest 
of his life in exile—first under a pension from King Henry's successor, then 
as Swedish ambassador to France. During this exile, he wrote his master­
piece, de Jure Belli ac Pads (DJB), or The [Natural] Right of War and 
Peace—the first major.work of international law. This work would remain 
almost continuously in print for the next two centuries. After Grotius's death, 
Samuel von Pufendorf would come to hold the chair in the "law of nature and 
nations"—a subject that Grotius was thought to have created. Rousseau 
would regularly use Grotius as a foil, describing him as a "dishonest child"; 
Kant would more politely criticize him as a "tiresome comforter." More 
positively, the American founders would read and recommend Grotius, citing 
him multiple times in the Federalist Papers J 
71 
72 Jeremy Seth Geddert 
After a century and a half of neglect, scholars are increasingly seeking to 
restore Grotius's great legacy today. However, the content of that rediscov­
ered reputation is remarkably contested. Is he a modern figure or a pre-
modern one? Jean Barbeyrac, the translator of an influential 1724 edition of 
DJB, would portray Grotius as a great innovator: the first to "break the ice" 
after "the long dark medieval winter."4 Giambattista Vico would even con­
sider Grotius to be one of the four "authors of history," following in the 
lineage of such modern trailblazers as Machiavelli and Bacon by introducing 
the methods of hypothesis and empirical verification into the historical-social 
sciences.5 Yet a recent translator, Oliver O'Donovan, sees Grotius instead as 
the last representative of a premodern conception of nature: "the last great 
figure in whose thought a unity of theology, law, philology, and history is 
effective."6 
Grotius's chronology does little to settle the question, as he stands at the 
crossroads of the medieval and the modern. He was a contemporary of both 
Descartes and Hobbes, and lived in the Paris whose Mersenne circle included 
both of those figures. Grotius's final decade saw the groundbreaking—and 
fundamentally modern—publications of Descartes's Discourse on Method 
and Hobbes's de Cive. Yet Grotius himself would be unable to recall a brief 
meeting with Descartes early in Descartes's career, and his private letters 
express his disagreement with Hobbes's basic presuppositions in de Cive. 
Nor does Grotius's approach to international relations offer much help in 
clarifying the ambiguity. His world was that of the Thirty Years' War, in 
which the pluralism of Europe was becoming an accepted fact of life. Gro­
tius's DJB anticipates the state sovereignty that would be enshrined in the 
1648 Treaty of Westphalia that concluded the war, and offers much guidance 
on a secular basis acceptable outside Christendom. Yet Grotius would none­
theless advocate for such decidedly premodern concepts as punitive war, 
humanitarian intervention, and restraints based on religion. 
Perhaps the most promising way to settle the question is to explore Gro­
tius's conception of nature. Some observers portray Grotius as the first mod­
ern natural law thinker, or even the first to develop a modern natural rights 
theory. One representative (and influential) figure is Richard Tuck, who 
attempts to show the similarities between Grotius and Hobbes. In doing so, 
he positions Grotius as a progenitor of modern thought and as accomplishing 
a fundamental break with the ancient approach to nature. Indeed, Tuck lo­
cates his treatment of Grotius in the Cambridge History of Medieval Thought 
under the heading "The End of Aristotelianism."7 
Tuck's argument for Grotius's essentially modern concept of nature has 
at least four elements. First, he sees in Grotius a preoccupation with skepti­
cism and an unwillingness to take for granted a natural moral order, which 
distinguishes Grotius from medieval writers.8 In the third paragraph of DJB, 
Grotius admits that some see "good" as a name rather than a reality. He 
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proceeds to outline Carneades's argument on behalf of this premise, and then 
argues against it.9 In doing so, Tuck argues that Grotius has already moved 
the ground of the argument from that of natural law to that of skepticism. 
Rather than taking a natural right foundation for granted, he attempts to 
convince the skeptics on their own terms.10 He is not content to defend 
natural right on the authority of history and tradition, but rather undertakes to 
prove it as if from the ground up. In this way, Tuck argues that he prefigures 
Descartes and Hobbes's distinctly modern method of reasoning that begins 
from the individual rather than from authority. 
Second, Tuck sees a further rejection of authority in Grotius's approach to 
Aristotle, the great philosopher of nature and touchstone of premodern politi­
cal thought. Inasmuch as medieval thinkers ever set out to combat skepti­
cism, they would do so by using the arguments of Aristotle. In contrast, 
Grotius remarks in his Prolegomena to DJB that Aristotle's preeminence has 
been turned into a tyranny, such that truth is nowhere "more repressed than 
by Aristotle's name." Rather than using Aristotle as an antidote to skepti­
cism, Grotius apparently targets Aristotle for criticism in the same fashion as 
Carneades (if perhaps for different reasons).11 In this reading, Grotius softens 
the ground for Hobbes's all-out attack on Aristotle.12 
In keeping with this approach of conceding ground to skeptics, Tuck 
thirdly argues that Grotius's defense of natural law is rather skeletal. Grotius 
reduces the thick conception of traditional medieval natural law to a mini­
malism more defensible to skeptics. In particular, Tuck sees in him a defense 
of natural law only on the basis of self-interest. He cites a passage from 
Grotius's early de Jure Praedae stating that "[T]he first principle of the 
natural order ... is the love whose primary force and action are toward 
oneself." Altruism is reducible to self-interest.13 This would prefigure 
Hobbes's contractarian political theory, one grounded on enlightened self-
interest rather than natural human sociability. 
Fourthly, Tuck understands Grotius to base this limited natural law on a 
modern basis of a priori rationalism. De Jure Praedae begins with a series of 
nine fundamental rules and thirteen associated laws. Tuck infers a Grotian 
intention to introduce a mathematical model into the human sciences—a 
distinctly modern methodology.14 He compares it to Leviathan, which begins 
with the basic right of nature and proceeds to deduce nineteen subsequent 
laws of nature.15 
Tuck does not put forward the fifth—and best-known—argument for 
Grotius's break with medieval world, but his reasoning is consistent with it. 
This is Grotius's (in)famous "impious hypothesis." After outlining his basic 
elements of justice, Grotius adds the following note: "what we have been 
saying would have a degree of validity even if we should concede that which 
cannot be conceded without the utmost wickedness, that there is no God, or 
that the affairs of men are of no concern to Him."16 In granting to atheists the 
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ability to know natural law, some see Grotius as consigning to irrelevance the 
knowledge of God for the study of the human world. He appears to reduce 
political philosophy to deist or atheist premises—supposedly a clear break 
with the classical tradition. 
These arguments all suggest that the ambiguity around Grotius's histori­
cal legacy can be solved by reference to his treatment of nature. Tuck thus 
uncovers a herald of modernity whose concept of nature is not a rich teleo-
logical conception of human flourishing but a thin rationalistic baseline of 
behavior. I would like to agree with the first premise about the importance of 
nature in Grotius; an examination of the concept helps to clarify the ambigu­
ity around his legacy. However, I would like to take issue with the second. A 
closer look at Grotius's concept of nature actually reveals a thinker seeking 
to preserve a rich classical heritage in a modern world. The language may be 
new, but the concepts are not. Grotius is best understood not as a proto-
Hobbesian enemy of Aristotle, but a translator of Aristotle in the idiom of 
modernity. 
QUESTIONING THE "GROTIUS AS MODERN" NARRATIVE 
Tuck is an erudite scholar, and all of the elements in this portrait of Grotius 
have a superficial plausibility. Before suggesting an alternative reading, it is 
necessary to engage with this portrait on its own terms. One basic and funda­
mental concern arises from Tuck's methodology, which prioritizes de Jure 
Praedae. Tuck portrays this work as paradigmatic and downplays de Jure 
Belli with the assertion that "the basic arguments ... are presented un­
changed, and indeed greatly clarified."17 Yet there are significant differences 
between the two. In de Jure Praedae, Grotius follows a voluntarist approach, 
which can perhaps be seen to prefigure Hobbes, and even the later post-
metaphysical modern thought of Hume and Kant. Yet in de Jure Belli, Gro­
tius clearly states that his natural laws are inherent in the nature of the 
universe, rather than deriving from the will of God. (If nothing else, his 
"impious hypothesis" makes this crystal clear.) If the truth of Grotius's argu­
ment is not dependent on God's action in the world (or even his mere exis­
tence), it seems clear that Grotius has fully repudiated the voluntarism of his 
earlier work. Defenders of scholasticism frequently point to the voluntarism 
of Scotus and Ockham as bringing about the end of naturalism. If this is 
indeed the relevant cleavage, Grotius appears to stand firmly with the Aristo­
telians. 
Indeed, if there is a fundamental shift from the 1604 de Jure Praedae to 
the 1625 de Jure Belli, it seems reasonable to suggest that de Jure Praedae 
was the anomaly. Already in the 1611 Meletius, Grotius begins to move 
away from his early voluntaristic position. What is more, Grotius wrote de 
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Jure Praedae at the ripe old age of twenty-one, an age at which few figures 
are well-established in their philosophical and theological foundations. 
While Grotius was undeniably a child prodigy, it seems rather a stretch to 
suggest that he plateaued after his early twenties. Furthermore, unlike the rest 
of Grotius's vast corpus (including seventeen volumes of correspondence), 
all but one chapter of de Jure Praedae remained unpublished until discov­
ered in 1868. Tuck's careful attention to de Jure Praedae has unearthed 
many insights into the work itself, but his attribution of its centrality to 
Grotius's thought is open to serious question. 
This casts doubt on Tuck's first premise that Grotius is preoccupied with 
skepticism. If Grotius's main focus is to combat skepticism, his engagement 
with Carneades is rather weak sauce. He spends a scant few paragraphs 
dealing with skepticism, and never again refers to the subject in the remain­
ing several hundred pages of de Jure Belli. Convinced skeptics would surely 
remain unmoved. Rather, Grotius's principal targets appear to be those who 
take up arms in defense of dogmatic minutiae, and his theological works 
show little concern for the need to prove the existence of natural right from 
the ground up.18 Ancient skepticism was indeed reemerging as a threat in the 
early seventeenth century, but Grotius did not seem to feel much of a need to 
prove it wrong. This seems to follow his medieval predecessors rather than to 
depart from them. 
This cursory attention to skepticism also undermines Tuck's fourth prop­
osition that Grotius is operating on the ground of the skeptics, or building an 
argument on a priori reason rather than traditional authority. In the very first 
paragraph of de Jure Belli, Grotius in fact sets out a tripartite epistemology, 
in which reason is supplemented both by revelation and history. He almost 
immediately employs this threefold approach to justify natural Right. Rea­
son, as Plato has shown, demonstrates that justice brings peace of con­
science,19 while injustice causes torments and anguish to the tyrannical soul. 
Revelation, which Grotius judges the most important of the three justifica­
tions, informs us that God eternally punishes injustice and rewards justice. 
Finally, history approves of justice and condemns injustice by "the common 
agreement of good men."20 Elsewhere, Grotius will deepen this account of 
history as a source of knowledge, arguing that the content of revelation is 
known through sacred history. 
In fact, de Jure Belli is littered with references to classical sources, and its 
Index of Authors Cited comes to a full forty pages. Grotius makes over a 
hundred citations each of Augustine, the Bible, Chrysostom, Cicero, Justin­
ian, Livy, Plutarch, Seneca, and even the Aristotle whose authority Grotius is 
allegedly attempting to undermine. In fact, if one looks immediately prior to 
the quote Tuck uses as evidence of Grotius's anti-Aristotelianism (his second 
argument), one finds the statement, "Among the philosophers Aristotle de­
servedly holds the foremost place." Soon after, Grotius states that "Our pur-
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pose is to make much account of Aristotle."21 Indeed, he begins his discus­
sion of many legal and political concepts with Aristotle, and in fact translates 
the entirety of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics V.8 in the midst of his own 
discussion of guilt and injury. This approach of heavy citation is consistent 
with his emphasis on history as a source of knowledge, as well as with his 
emphasis on incorporating and building off of those who have gone before.22 
It is not even clear that Grotius breaks with the medieval tradition to 
create a proto-Hobbesian minimalist natural law, pace Tuck's fourth argu­
ment. Some identify in Grotius a modern innovation that considers parts of 
the Decalogue as only divine law and not part of the natural law. However, 
this interpretation was not original to Grotius; over three hundred years earli­
er, Scotus had made a similar argument. Furthermore, Grotius's DJB applies 
the principles of natural law to innumerable potential situations of interna­
tional practice in much the same way as did the scholastics to the moral life. 
Grotius's recognition that not all truths of Christian revelation are accessible 
to natural reason is hardly new or radical. If he is an innovator, it is in his 
attempt to extend the reach of classical natural law outside the confines of the 
political community, not to limit it. 
Finally, Grotius's use of the "impious hypothesis" is arguably less impi­
ous than it appears. For one thing, Grotius immediately emphasizes the pure­
ly counterfactual nature of the hypothesis. Employing his aforementioned 
tripartite epistemology, he promptly defends God's existence by reference to 
natural reason, divine miracles, and unbroken human tradition.23 More im­
portantly, even his hypothetical may be less impious than it appears. He may 
be proposing a materialistic world with no God whatsoever, or a cosmos with 
a prime mover, or in fact a deistic universe in which "the affairs of men are 
of no concern to [God]." Should he mean one of the latter two options, this 
statement would be no more controversial than the naturalistic metaphysics 
of Aristotle himself, which were in fact embraced by scholastic thinkers as a 
way to counter the proto-modern voluntarism of their (impious?) adversar­
ies.24 Even if one remains unconvinced of Grotius's piety, one must at least 
acknowledge that this "impious" claim far precedes Grotius. It traces its 
lineage back to the fourteenth century in Gregory of Rimini and Gabriel Biel, 
and even the neo-Scholastic Suarez made a similar assertion.25 Thus, the 
mere presence of the "impious hypothesis" is insufficient evidence on which 
to judge Grotius an essential modern, let alone an enemy of the premodern 
tradition. 
GROTIUS'S HUMAN NATURE AS NON-REDUCTIONISTIC 
These arguments suggest that Grotius does not comfortably fit the portrait of 
"modern revolutionary." However, they do not yet demonstrate the substan-
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tive classical continuity of his approach to nature. A closer look at Grotius's 
foundations helps to fill in the positive elements of the picture. However, his 
understanding of human nature, like many concepts in his writing, is not 
straightforward and accessible. As one commentator notes, in some places 
Grotius seems to say one thing, in other places another. For instance, in some 
passages Grotius refers to man's self-seeking nature. Certainly these pas­
sages do not escape the notice of observers such as Tuck. Yet in other places 
Grotius speaks of altruism. This has led some to conclude that Grotius is 
simply inconsistent in his portrait of human nature.26 
Yet perhaps it is more plausible to interpret Grotius's apparent contradic­
tions as a consistent belief that human nature is not monistic. To draw a 
parallel, Plato's typology of souls shows that human nature can be focused 
on reason, honor, or the passions. Yet the simultaneous existence of tyrants 
and philosophers does not mean that Plato's understanding of human nature 
is inconsistent. This pluralistic (or at least non-monistic) view of the human 
soul can be more concretely inferred from Grotius's view that it is better to 
enter into civil society, even though man is social and can already punish 
wrongdoing in the "state of nature" (a term Grotius never uses). He justifies 
the institution of third-party judges by reference to the fact that individuals 
"too often have their own interests in view."27 This indicates that individuals 
sometimes act according to justice and sometimes according to self-interest. 
Thus, there must be at least two parts of the soul—the justice-oriented part 
and the self-interested part—which are in tension with each other. Further­
more, there must also be times when the just part of the soul is victorious and 
the individual consequently acts in an altruistic manner. 
This non-reductionistic conception of the soul is also evident in Grotius's 
statement that "man is, to be sure, an animal, but an animal of a superior 
kind, much farther removed from all other animals than the different kinds of 
animals are from one another."28 Man shares some characteristics with ani­
mals, and some men (particularly children) may share many of these charac­
teristics. However, man also possesses a unique capacity of discursive rea­
son, allowing him to develop his capacity for practical wisdom. If a man 
chooses to correctly orient his will, he may become a "mature man,"29 which 
brings to mind Aristotle's conception of the spoudaios. Such wisdom cannot 
be c haracteristic of mere animals. Nor is it the automatic possession of all 
men, as Hobbes seemed to view all human abilities.30 Rather, it must be 
developed through uniquely human skill and experience.31 This process of 
movement toward what seems to be a human telos implies the concepts of 
potentiality and actuality, which again bears an Aristotelian imprint. 
This multifaceted conception of the soul points toward a classical inspira­
tion. Many modern thinkers such as Hobbes, Marx, and contemporary advo­
cates of homo economicus attempt to create a science of man by eliminating 
all but one variable. Man's behavior can be predicted by reference to single-
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cause explanations such as fear of violent death, class struggle, or desire for 
economic gain. Each of these three modern positions suggests a monistic 
view of the soul. In contrast, Grotius's pluralistic conception of the soul 
leaves room for a will whose actions can never be predicted with certitude. 
GROTIUS'S HUMAN NATURE AS RATIONAL 
Grotius develops this idea of natural human reason more concretely when he 
suggests that reason ought to control man's self-interested passions.32 He 
writes that animals have a sort of nature which allows them to "secure advan­
tage for themselves." However, man has a moral faculty, which leads a man 
to refrain from harming others, even when it causes him a disadvantage.33 
Thus, reason is not merely a calculating tool used to procure the "predeter­
mined" end of advantage. Rather, reason itself can discern a good that 
transcends advantage. He states that man's nature is to "follow the direction 
of a well-tempered judgement, being neither led astray by fear or the allure­
ment of immediate pleasure, not carried away by rash impulse."34 The con­
cept of a rational will which can deliberate on moral ends further emphasizes 
Grotius's Aristotelian heritage and his opposition to Hobbes. Hobbes argues 
that reason is simply a calculative function, in service to man's passions. As 
Alasdair Maclntyre has argued, the move from a rational will which could 
deliberate on moral ends toward a calculative reason that could only deter­
mine means to ends is a defining feature of modernity.35 
This difference is evident in Grotius's and Hobbes's treatment of specific 
behaviors. Grotius accepts Aristotle's understanding that fear of pain is in­
continence, and that men have a moral responsibility not to succumb to it.36 
For this reason, although a promise made under fear is binding, the one who 
caused the fear is under a moral obligation to release the promisor.37 In 
contrast, Hobbes argues that man naturally fears violent death. Men can thus 
have no obligation to overcome this passion, but rather should calculate how 
political institutions can be structured to prevent its negative external effects. 
The same difference applies to vainglory, which Grotius sees as symptomatic 
of moral weakness, implying that it must be overcome by moral effort.38 In 
contrast, Hobbes sees vainglory as a constant and permanent striving of man, 
to be subdued only by the coercive force of the Leviathan. Even in regard to 
man's desires themselves, Grotius refers to Aristotle's distinction between 
natural desires and unnatural ones.39 Once again, in reductive scientific fash­
ion, Hobbes sees only natural desires. Some observers may read that Grotius 
sees man as an animal, or as having passions, and conclude that he must be 
similar to Hobbes. However, for Grotius, the animalistic passions are not the 
whole of man. To assert that man is an animal is insufficient evidence of 
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modern materialism; one would have to further assert that man is only an 
animal. Grotius clearly espouses the former. 
GROTIUS'S HUMAN NATURE AS SOCIAL 
The idea that man is capable of acting altruistically and out of motives other 
than fear is crucial to Grotius's understanding of human nature as inherently 
sociable. In this regard, one of the most important statements in the entire de 
Jure Belli is Grotius's assertion, contrary to Carneades, that "the very nature 
of man, which even if we had no lack of anything, would lead us into the 
mutual relations of society."40 Human nature—man in the state of nature—is 
inherently social. 
The importance of this statement can be seen by contrasting it with Hob-
besian man. Hobbes holds that individuals are motivated by acquisitiveness, 
diffidence, and vainglory. However, the resulting goods are external goods, 
which is to say that they are limited. Thus, their possession is relative; if 
every person has societal glory or honor, no person has it. Because everyone 
desires these zero-sum goods, the world is characterized by scarcity and 
competition. There cannot be friendship, only mastery. As Hobbes says, 
"every man has a right... to one another's body"—and he is hardly referring 
to Plato's Utopian community of wives and children.41 Society arises precise­
ly because we lack things: specifically, basic security of body. Even physical 
external goods (those corresponding to the body rather than the passions), 
while perhaps not entirely zero-sum, are necessarily limited and subject to 
scarcity. 
In contrast, Grotius states that man would enter society even if he had no 
lack of anything, including security of person. Even if everyone possessed all 
the external, physical goods they could want, they would still want intangible 
goods—specifically, social existence. Men desire not only physical goods 
but friendship. Friendship is an internal, intrinsic good, corresponding to the 
part of man's nature which transcends either (self-interested) physical exis­
tence or the (self-interested) desire for mastery of others. As an internal and 
nonrelative good, it cannot be described as zero-sum, and thus is not dimin­
ished by being shared.42 This likely explains Grotius's assertion that the state 
with justice is more fortunate than the state with arms.43 Hobbes would 
surely disagree. 
The related concept of a social and political realm, characterized by other-
oriented friendship, has some roots in Aristotle. However, the Christian view 
of self-giving love further develops the concept of friendship as an internal 
good not subject to scarcity or zero-sum status. In fact, it is precisely in such 
sharing that one receives. Although de Jure Belli is not a treatise on friend­
ship, Grotius's reference to friendship indicates that he is firmly in the Aris-
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totelian-Christian camp. As he says, "We are drawn to friendship spontane­
ously and by our own nature ... charity often advises me to put the good of 
many above my own good."44 
GROTIUS'S NATURAL REASON AS PRUDENTIAL 
Just as Grotius's concept of human nature draws on the ancient model, so 
does his understanding of natural reason. He begins his theory of knowledge 
by asking the question of how one can discern the law of nature. He lists two 
possible approaches. One is through a posteriori reason, which gathers evi­
dence of those principles common to all nations—or at least all civilized 
nations. The other is a priori reason, producing conclusions to which any 
rational person must assent upon demonstration. Such knowledge is akin to 
mathematical proofs "which are at once recognized and admitted."45 
At first glance, these approaches may appear similar to those of Hobbes 
and Locke, who argue that nature can only be known through the senses and 
that the rules of logic then guide the mind in synthesizing this sense-data. 
Hobbes, in particular, equated reason with mathematical calculation, and one 
might be inclined to see in Grotius's reference to mathematics a latent Hob-
besian position. Yet for Grotius, a priori reasoning is not the only way to 
determine the (obviously moral) laws of nature. More importantly, however, 
he cites Aristotle on the matter: "certainty is not to be found in moral ques­
tions in the same degree as in mathematical science."46 This explains his 
earlier statement that a not-entirely-universal acceptance of a particular no­
tion does not jeopardize its status as true. He points out that honey does not 
cease to be sweet simply because a sick man is unable to perceive its sweet­
ness.47 This is a contrast to Hobbes, who repeatedly discerns universal laws 
of nature in what he self-consciously considers a purely deductive fashion. 
Furthermore, Grotius goes on to refer to the fact that moral life often 
involves determining a mean—one that is prudential rather than mathemati­
cal.48 Grotius thus acknowledges a difference between natural law reasoning 
and good judgment.49 The latter is a foreign concept to Hobbes, whose Levi­
athan has no prudence, only volitional law. Grotius's emphasis on prudence, 
the fundamental political virtue of Aristotle, is another indicator of a classical 
understanding of politics, one which holds that a good state arises only 
through virtuous character. This stands in contrast to a modern scientific 
view of politics suggesting that proper institutional design and law is suffi­
cient. Not surprisingly, Grotius uses the term "science" less than a dozen 
times in his work. In contrast, Hobbes makes it clear that he is applying the 
methods of modern political science, of which he is the founder.50 It is worth 
noting that in his theory of knowledge, Grotius does not deny the existence of 
faculties, such as a priori reason, employed by moderns like Hobbes and 
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Locke. However, he does not view the use of these faculties as exclusive of 
all others. This refusal to take a reductionistic approach to reason echoes his 
aforementioned multifaceted conception of human nature. 
GROTIUS AND HISTORY 
Grotius's a posteriori reason further illuminates a source of knowledge out­
side the a priori reason often attributed to him as evidence of his essential 
modernity: that of history. His aforementioned tripartite epistemology iden­
tifies history as an important source of natural Right. However, it also serves 
as an organizing principle for the third book of DJB. Here Grotius devotes 
one chapter to enumerating the restraints of reason on carrying out war. He 
then proceeds to add a hefty six more exploring the restraints arising from 
historical tacit agreement. This suggests that the counsel of nature is most 
fully manifested in the historically evolved practices or agreements of man's 
free will.51 Throughout DJB, Grotius provides a detailed treatment of inter­
national custom (jus gentium) as morally binding on nations.52 By using 
historical examples and citations, he attempts to demonstrate the congruence 
of many positive laws with natural law.53 Grotius in fact criticizes writers of 
his own day for having neglected to supply illustrations from history and 
endeavors to correct this oversight.54 
Some might argue that this focus on history opens up history as an inde­
pendent agent with a logic of its own. This might be seen to relativize truth or 
even to suggest an achievable end of history that inevitably precipitates mil-
lenarian violence. Strauss's Natural Right and History famously suggests 
history as a modern force opposed to classical natural right, and Voegelin 
repeatedly warns against immanentizing the eschaton. On the contrary, how­
ever, I would suggest that Grotius's approach to history is not so much 
modern (let alone eschatological) as it is Christian. The ancient Greek con­
ception of history is cyclical; Plato expects the ideal city to decline simply 
because the seasonal patterns of growth and decay flow inexorably from the 
nature of things. To this cyclical view Augustine counterposes a linear theol­
ogy of history, one that points to a release from inevitable decline at the end 
of time. On this foundation of possible progress the church then builds the 
idea of development of doctrine; Christians are better off knowing that Christ 
is one person with two natures. Even more central to Christianity, however, 
is the fact that the birth, death, and resurrection of Christ are moments in 
human history without which, as St. Paul says, "faith is in vain."55 To be a 
Christian is to assent to a truth unavailable during earlier periods of history. 
What is more, Christ does not give a new Ten Commandments but instead 
speaks in parables. The spirit of the law cannot be propounded in formula­
tions; it must be illustrated in narratives. In this way, Christ points to the 
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limits of the Hebraic law; for instance, in the act of healing a man on the 
Sabbath, he shows that its spirit supersedes its letter. (St. Paul will further 
deemphasize the law; it can convict but cannot justify.)56 Because God re­
veals himself most fully through the person of Christ, one can only come to 
know the heights of divinity through the historical record of his actions— 
most notably his passion and death. 
Indeed, Grotius's oeuvre is self-consciously Christian. In addition to his 
counsels of Christian virtue in de Jure Belli, he also wrote several theo-
political and theological treatises, one of which put forward a theory of 
Christ's Atonement still current in the Methodist Church. Grotius also wrote 
a work of Christian apologetics that would be published over a hundred times 
in a dozen languages. Finally, he devoted his last decade to a massive two-
million-word commentary on the Bible that particularly seeks to illuminate 
the historical circumstances that surround the words of Scripture.57 For in­
stance, when Christ says that he has come not to oppose but to fulfill the law, 
Grotius points out that Christ is referring both to the Hebraic civil law and 
the law of God and that Christ fulfills the law not only through his doctrine 
but through his example.58 
Moreover, this Christian emphasis on fulfilling rather than overthrowing 
the Hebraic law might just as well apply to the ancient conception of natural 
Right as residing in the character of the philosopher. Plato illustrates this 
conception in his Statesman by outlining the sixfold typology of regimes 
more commonly associated with Aristotle's Politics. He then adds a seventh 
type, that of statesmanship, which is characterized not by law but by the art 
of ruling. Here the statesman acts as a sort of "living law."59 This shows that 
the depersonalized law is one step removed from (and thus ontologically 
dependent on) the personal art of ruling, just as dianoia depends on a higher 
nous. Aristotle also illustrates this conception with his idea of the spoudaios, 
who must discern the good in particular situations, but cannot make universal 
prescriptions of his actions. For this reason, Strauss himself writes that Aris­
totle's concept of natural Right resides more in concrete decisions than in 
general propositions.60 Hence, in order to learn practical wisdom, one must 
observe the spoudaios. Without direct personal access to Plato's statesman or 
Aristotle's spoudaios, one must rely on historical accounts. This substan­
tiates history as revealing nature rather than sweeping it away. In this way, 
Grotius's approach to history as a source of knowledge is not a modern 
proto-Hegelian stance but a Christian incorporation of the insights of ancient 
natural Right. 
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GROTIUS AND SUBJECTIVE NATURAL RIGHTS 
Grotius's emphasis on history continues when he seeks to justify the exis­
tence and origins of private property. Here he proceeds in much the same 
way as had Pope John XXII in the Franciscan property dispute that Brian 
Tierney identifies as the origin of natural rights.61 Grotius does not provide a 
theological Filmerian argument that property was present from the very be­
ginnings of man and passed down from Adam. Neither does he propose a 
proto-Lockean argument that property ownership is inherent in work of one's 
hands. Rather, he draws on history and prudence. At some early point in 
history, humanity prudentially determined that the institution of private prop­
erty could enable man to more fully live out his rational and social existence. 
This collective reasoning was manifested in the consent of men to these 
arrangements.62 This is consistent with Grotius's conception that rational 
natural law may usefully be supplemented by practical judgment. Humans 
are free to make behavior-limiting contracts that go beyond the duties im­
posed by natural law. 
However, this introduction of subjective natural rights to property has led 
some observers to argue that Grotius is fundamentally modern. After all, if 
one has a right to property, one can then do with that property what one will; 
the possession in no way depends on a teleological account of the proper role 
of property in human flourishing. Indeed, any subjective right confers an 
absolute sphere of freedom on its holder, connoting a realm of individual 
sovereignty. In other words, subjective natural rights seem to give the holder 
the freedom to act against an overarching standard known to classical philos­
ophy as natural Right. Is this not good evidence that Grotius is finally a 
modern? Why allow individuals the right to ignore the higher ends of human 
existence? 
I would suggest that the answer to these questions draws on the same 
logic as does Grotius's emphasis on history, again rooted more in Christian­
ity than in modernity. The ancient concept of nature certainly points toward 
an overarching standard of Tightness. However, it lacks a deep concept of 
conscience. Indeed, classical philosophy generally assumes that the problem 
of politics is ignorance; if people know the truth (or are governed by philoso­
pher-kings who do), they will act virtuously. However, Christianity develops 
the idea of the individual will and the possibility of its weakness. As St. Paul 
writes in the Epistle to the Romans, "for what I would, that do I n ot; but what 
I hate, that do I."63 To this idea of individual conscience Christianity adds the 
idea of individual salvation. No longer is eternity available through a national 
covenant with God (as in the Hebrew world) or through the moral education 
of philosophical governors (as in Platonic philosophy). Rather, Christ an­
nounces that "the Kingdom of God is within you." 64 
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For this reason, one's character when carrying out an act is more impor­
tant than the act itself. It is now better to do the wrong thing for the right 
reason than vice versa. Indeed, orthodox Christianity is reluctant to condemn 
all those outside the church. Despite their ignorance of Christianity, their 
intentions—known only to God—may yet be justified. Christianity thus 
introduces the concept of invincible ignorance—a concept incompatible with 
the strict nature of pre-Christian reason. (To use an analogue from physical 
nature, the natural law of gravity makes no exception for skydivers who 
earnestly seek to open their unknowingly defective parachutes.) 
The implication of this emphasis on intention is that true virtue cannot be 
coerced; the Christian cannot force the cavedweller to turn around. Rather, 
virtue must be freely chosen. Christian grace does not compel; it can only 
sweetly inspire. Hence, Christianity grants to humanity the freedom to act 
against God and nature, and to refuse grace. By granting this right, one can 
be sure that any subsequent good act is freely chosen and thus genuinely (and 
not only apparently) virtuous. In this way, one might argue that subjective 
natural rights actually deepen natural Right. Natural rights need not oppose 
natural Right, because one can very well exercise his individual natural right 
according to the higher standard. However, such exercise is more praise­
worthy when one had the right to do otherwise. 
Moreover, the concept of natural rights may in fact awaken a sense of 
ownership in the agent who holds a right. If one is now saved as an individu­
al soul rather than as a member of a chosen nation, one cannot shift the 
responsibility onto others and hope to free-ride to salvation. Nor can one 
blame the shackles of circumstance; if one is now only accountable for his 
response to the light he has been shown, the absence of a Socratic guide 
toward the sun is no excuse for inaction. This emphasis on personal respon­
sibility further accounts for Grotius's belief that self-interest and charity 
simultaneously coexist in human nature. The former is, in fact, the gift of a 
provident God, because one's self-interest requires cooperation with others, 
thus leading one to take on freely chosen responsibilities.65 Much like Toc-
queville's concept of "interest rightly understood," one's own right may lead 
to an enlargement of one's sense of responsibility. The extrinsic incentive 
may gradually lead to the development of intrinsic (and thus genuinely virtu­
ous) motives. 
For this reason, medieval theorists had argued that individual rights and 
the common good are complementary rather than conflicting aspects of the 
human condition. Because Grotius's philosophy leaves room for intrinsic, 
incorporeal goods, he continues in this tradition. Once again, commentators 
might focus on the appearance of "self-interested" Grotius and read in him a 
proto-Hobbesian conception of man. But because Grotius has a non-reduc-
tionistic concept of human nature, man is self-interested while also being 
more than merely self-interested.66 In other words, individual rights do con-
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fer an absolute modern liberty to reject the teleology of ancient natural Right. 
However, Grotius introduces them not to allow an escape from natural Right 
but in the hopes of making the instantiation of natural Right a more fully 
praiseworthy choice. He may thus help to enlarge the possibilities of human 
action in the hopes that it will lead the person toward an end that transcends 
humanity. 
NATURAL RIGHTS AND HISTORY: 
GROTIUS'S MODERN TRANSLATION 
Has nature lost its appeal in the modern world? The word "teleology" would 
fail a first round of political focus groups, and even the mere language of 
virtue tends to arouse mental images of Saudi morality police. Yet the preva­
lence of human rights discourse around the globe suggests that the implicit 
concept of natural rights retains wide currency. If they do not mandate a 
movement toward the fullness of human flourishing, they do prevent the 
worst abuses against humanity. Individual natural rights are thus unlikely to 
recede anytime soon, and despite the occasionally absurd inflation of rights 
claims, even most critics of rights would be sorry to see them disappear. In 
this way, Grotius may offer a way to maintain some link to the ancient 
understanding of nature in a pluralistic modern world that resists legal man­
dates based on comprehensive doctrines. 
Nonetheless, if rights are here to stay for the foreseeable future, there are 
surely better and worse ways to conceive of them. The task is to emphasize 
that rights are a beginning, not an end. Grotius does precisely this. By confer­
ring a sphere of individual sovereignty on the right holder, Grotius conceptu­
alizes rights as protecting the freedom to make a truly virtuous choice. Rights 
are grounded on a rich conception of the subject amenable to contemporary 
discourse. Yet while Grotius's natural rights can be promulgated on a non-
teleological basis, they ultimately point toward a vision of human flourish­
ing. The careful reader will find that Grotius's concept of subjectivity is 
ultimately rooted in an older Christian development of the ancient emphasis 
on virtue as residing in the soul. 
The same is true of the political language of history. Few today would 
respond to a political discourse that rejects the several past centuries as a 
grand mistake. Grotius's concept of history allows for the possibility of 
progress and thus avoids the kind of fatalism or even cynicism that con­
sciously propagates self-defeating practices from a belief that decline is inev­
itable. Likewise, a belief in the relevance of particular historical circum­
stances allows for legitimate diversity among societies, combating an unso­
phisticated application of nature as a one-size-fits-all proposition. 
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Yet Grotius sees history not as an autonomous force, but rather as the 
locus in which nature is revealed. His Aristotelian concept of nature implicit­
ly justifies history as the realm in which the virtues of natural Right are 
instantiated and thus known. This allows for a culturally sensitive under­
standing of nature that nonetheless rejects cultural relativism. Furthermore, 
his Christian development of history makes him fully aware of the reality of 
sin and the impossibility of perfection in secular history. Progress is anything 
but guaranteed or linear. This guards against ideologies that would promise a 
Utopia at the cost of trampling the human dignity of enemies of the revolu­
tion. 
In this way, the ambiguity of Grotius's legacy, following from his situa­
tion at the crossroads between the ancient and modern world, may allow him 
to maintain one foot in each. His modern idiom of natural rights and history 
offers a (perhaps compact) entry point to nature. However, his ancient con­
ception of man as fundamentally rational and social bids the right holder to 
exercise his liberty in a way that points to a higher conception of human 
existence rather than permitting him to ignore it. Thus, the rearticulation of a 
Grotian approach to nature (and its implicit classical-Christian foundations) 
may offer a realistic way to enrich contemporary political discourse. If the 
modern world generally has ears to hear talk of nature in only one language, 
Grotius may be a valuable translator. 
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